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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. A THOUROUGH AND SEARCHING COLLEGUY IS NECESSARY 
TO ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE WAIVER OF THE 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT EVERY STAGE OF A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING. 
"A waiver of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is of no less 
moment to an accused who must decide whether to plead guilty than to an accused who 
stands trial." Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) (citations omitted). 
Through case decisions, Utah has prescribed the type of "thorough inquiry of the 
defendant [necessary] to fulfill [a trial court's] duty of insuring that the defendant's 
waiver of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." State v. Heaton, 
958 P.2d 911,918 (Utah 1998). Despite Appellees' contentions, Utah's case decisions 
addressing the colloquy necessary to obtain an effective waiver of counsel have not been 
overturned. Appellees' Response Brief 26. 
Appellees contend that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Iowa v. 
Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) overrules Utah's case decisions "require[ing] a more searching 
colloquy than Tovar." Appellee Response Brief 26. However, Tovar expressly limits its 
holding to the determination of whether the two specific admonitions required by the 
Iowa Supreme Court were required under the Sixth Amendment and, in fact, actually 
supports Utah's case decisions requiring a thorough colloquy before a defendant's waiver 
can be considered constitutionally adequate. 
In Tovar, the defendant, in 1996, desired to plead guilty to operating a motor 
vehicle under the influence of alcohol (OWI). 541 U.S. at 82. The trial court then 
conducted the guilty plea colloquy as required by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Id. at 83 The trial court engaged in the following colloquy with Tovar: 
[I]f Tovar pleaded not guilty, he would be entitled to a speedy and public 
trial by jury, and would have the right to be represented at that trial by an 
attorney, who '"could help [Tovar] select a jury, question and cross-examine 
the State's witnesses, present evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make 
arguments to the judge and jury on [his] behalf. By pleading guilty, the 
court cautioned, "not only [would Tovar] give up [his] right to a trial [of 
any kind on the charge against him], [he would] give up [his] right to be 
represented by an attorney at that trial." The court further advised Tovar 
that, if he entered a guilty plea, he would relinquish the right to remain 
silent at trial, and the right to the presumption of innocence, and the right to 
subpoena witnesses and compel their testimony. 
Id. 
The court then informed Tovar of the maximum and minimum penalties for an 
OWI conviction. Id. Next, the court explained to Tovar that before it could accept his 
guilty plea, "the court had to assure itself that Tovar was in fact guilty of the charged 
offense." Id. The court then informed Tovar of the elements necessary for an OWI 
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conviction. Id. at 83-84. "[Ojbserving that there was 'a factual basis' for [the plea]" 
and that Tovar had made his plea "voluntarily, with a full understanding of [his] rights, 
[and] . . . of the consequences of [pleading guilty]," the court accepted Tovar's guilty 
plea. Id, at 84. As a result of his guilty plea, Tovar was sentenced to two days in jail 
and a fine. Id, In 1998, Tovar was charged with a second offense of OWI, an 
aggravated misdemeanor, which he plead guilty to with the assistance of counsel. Id, at 
85. Then in 2000, Tovar was charged with his third offense of OWI which was 
enhanced to a felony based on his prior convictions. Id With the assistance of counsel, 
Tovar moved to preclude the use of his 1996 conviction arguing that his waiver of his 
right to counsel was invalid "because he was never made aware by the court of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Id. 
The trial court and the court of appeals affirmed Tovar's conviction but the Iowa 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that in order to obtain a constitutionally valid waiver 
of the right to counsel at the plea stage: 
[T]he trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that there are 
defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that 
the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead 
guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked. The defendant 
should be admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose 
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the 
facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty. In addition, the court 
must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charges against 
him and the range of allowable punishments. 
Id at 86-87. 
Tovar did not receive these specific warnings, therefore, the Iowa Supreme Court 
held that his waiver was not constitutionally valid. Id, at 86. The United States Supreme 
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Court, granted certiorari to address "the sole question [of] whether the Sixth Amendment 
compels the two admonitions here in controversy." Id. at 91-92. 
Iowa argued that its "plea colloquy suffices both to advise a defendant of his right 
to counsel, and to assure that his guilty plea is informed and voluntary." Id. at 90. 
According to the state's argument, the plea colloquy "'makes plain that an attorney's role 
would be to challenge the charge or sentence,' and therefore adequately conveys to the 
defendant both the utility of counsel and the dangers of self-representation." Id, The 
Supreme Court rejected the state's broad sweeping argument, instead applying a type of 
totality of the circumstances approach. Id, The Court noted that because other factors 
exist in this case, it "need not endorse the State's position that nothing more than the plea 
colloquy was needed to safeguard Tovar's right to counsel" for the case to be resolved. 
Id, 
Instead, the Court evaluated the case as it does all cases regarding the validity of 
waivers of the right to counsel, basing its decision on "the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding [a] case." Id, at 93. The Court noted that this was the mistake 
the Iowa court made in "overlooking the Court's] observations that the information a 
defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will 'depend, in each case, upon the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case.'" Id at 92 (quoting Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). While the Court has never "prescribed any formula or 
script to be read to a defendant who states" that he desires to proceed without the 
assistance of counsel, 
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The information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent 
election, [the Supreme Court's] decisions indicate, will depend on a range 
of case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or 
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the 
stage of the proceeding. 
Id at 88. 
Under the particular facts in Tovar, the Court stated "it is far from clear that 
warnings of the kind required by the Iowa Supreme Court would have enlightened 
Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself." Id. at 93. Rather, as 
suggested by the United States as amicus curiae, such specific warnings "might be 
misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant 
could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one." Id. While 
specifically limiting its holding to the determination "that the two admonitions the Iowa 
Supreme Court ordered are not required by the Federal Constitution," the Court noted 
"that States are free to adopt by . . . decision any guides to the acceptance of an 
uncounseled plea they deem useful." Id. at 94. Utah case decisions have adopted such 
guidelines to ensure a defendant is not denied his right to counsel See State v. Heaton, 
958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998); State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224, 95 P.3d 1182, cert 
granted 106 P.3d 743. 
In 1998, the Utah Supreme Court decided Heaton, where it stated that 
before [a] court may permit [a] defendant to proceed without the assistance 
of counsel, [it] must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill 
its duty of insuring that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made. In making this determination, the court 
must advise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation "so that the record will establish that che knows what he is 
doing and his choice is made with eyes open. . . .'" In addition, the trial 
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court should (1) advise the defendant of his constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to represent 
himself; (2) ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and 
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to 
represent himself, . . . and (3) ascertain that the defendant comprehends the 
nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible 
punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad understanding of 
the case. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (internal citations omitted). 
The Court then recommended that trial courts follow a sixteen-point colloquy "as 
an effective means by which to determine whether the defendant has validly waived his 
right to counsel." Id, at 918 n.5 (citing State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 n.12 (Utah 
1987)). Pedockie, a case decided three months after Tovar was issued, reaffirmed the 
supreme court's holding in Heaton regarding the validity of a defendant's waiver of 
counsel. 2004 UT App 224 at ^ [37. 
Like the analysis in Tovar, this Court in Pedockie began its inquiry of whether the 
defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent by looking at "the particular 
facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case." Id. at ^35 (quotations and citations 
omitted). This Court noted that the supreme court "has repeatedly and strongly 
recommended, but not mandated, that trial courts address [the dangers and disadvantages 
of self-representation] using the sixteen-point colloquy set forth in State v. Frampton." 
Id at TJ35 n.6 (citing State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 ffi[23-24, 979 P.2d 799; Heaton, 958 
P.2d at 918 n.5). However, at a minimum, a trial court should engage defendant in a 
colloquy addressing the three factors in Heaton. Id. at ^ [35. 
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Under the particular facts and circumstances of Peterson's case, this type of 
thorough inquiry necessary for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel 
did not occur. See Appellant's Opening Brief 25-46. In addition to the omissions 
outlined in Appellant's Opening Brief, most glaring is the omission of any evidence from 
either the justice court docket or from the justice court judge's testimony that the 
elements of the crimes were ever explained by the court to Mr. Peterson or that a factual 
basis to support his guilty plea was ever established. The waivers signed by Mr. Peterson 
lack a factual basis for the plea. See Addendum E in Appellant's Opening Brief. The 
only testimony offered by the justice court judge was regarding his general practice in 
accepting guilty pleas where he stated in part that "I read them the charges, the date that it 
allegedly occurred, location." R. 145:55. No testimony was offered regarding what this 
entails or that it was actually done in Mr. Peterson's case. Moreover, the justice court 
judge does not appear to include a factual basis as part of his general practice. We do not 
know whether the judge actually outlined the elements of the crimes and established a 
factual basis for each or whether the judge simply stated the code section Mr. Peterson 
was alleged to have violated along with the date and location. 
At a minimum, in order to have a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to 
counsel it is necessary that the nature of the offenses and a factual basis be explained to a 
defendant. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (requiring judge to ascertain that defendant 
understands nature of the charges and proceedings for there to be a constitutionally valid 
waiver of counsel). A defendant will not appreciate the full measure of a waiver of 
counsel in a case where he has not been properly advised of the charges and the elements 
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necessary for guilt under the statute. This is supported not only by Utah's case decisions 
regarding constitutionally valid waivers of the right to counsel but also Tovar. See 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917; Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81. 
The omission of any evidence to support that the nature of the crime and a factual 
basis were discussed with Mr. Peterson alone precludes a determination that a 
constitutionally valid waiver of the right to counsel occurred. However, as outline in 
Appellant's Opening Brief, several other factors support that Mr. Peterson's waiver was 
invalid. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Peterson waived his right 
to counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in Appellant's Opening Brief, Justin Brent 
Peterson, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the lower court's decision and order 
that his suspended jail sentence be vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this | Z day of April, 2006 
^X^^ *£~ «— —-
Debra M. Nelson 
Attorney for Appellant 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, DEBRA M. NELSON, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered 
the original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South 
State, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to 
George B. Hofmann, Parsons Kinghorn Peters, 111 East Broadway, 11th Floor, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this XL- day of April, 2006. 
DEBRA M.NELSON 
DELIVERED to George B. Hofmann, Parsons Kinghorn Peters, as indicated 
above this day of April, 2006. 
tiy. 
9 
